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Abstract:  
 
Unlike the monetary and financial international organizations which where born during 
World War II and in the immediate post-war years, the WTO was created only in 1994. The 
GATT negotiated in 1947 was initially conceived as a temporary agreement while waiting for 
the creation of an International Trade Organization, which was finally never created. 
Nevertheless as like as in financial matters, some thinkers have built projects on such an 
organization before and during World War II. Among them there are two Americans: Cordell 
Hull and Percy Wells Bidwell. This paper compares both projects and investigates whether it 
can be said that Hull was the spiritual father of the WTO as some of the Cordell Hull Institute 
papers claim it. 
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Cordell Hull is sometimes considered the spiritual father of the WTO (Hagel, 2003; 
Curzon Price, 2004; Dam, 2004). As early as 1916, when he was a Representative of 
Tennessee, he suggested the creation of a permanent organization in charge of international 
trade topics  to Secretary of State Lansing. But this project went unnoticed. Appointed 
Secretary of State by F.D. Roosevelt in 1933, Hull held this office at a stretch until November 
1944. His policy and particularly his involvement in the creation of United Nations earned 
him the Nobel Prize of Peace 1945. Although the Secretary of State was given the 
responsibility of the American trade policy during the first years of his office, Hull had not 
been in position to achieve his seminal project. During World War II, thinking about such an 
organization was left by the Department of State to the Council of Foreign Relation’s (CFR) 
care. Famous economists like A. Hansen and J. Viner took part in that structure. However, 
they did not mainly devote their thoughts to an international organization specifically 
intended for international trade. The authorship of a solidly structured project of an 
International Trade Agency was due to another member of the CFR: the economist Percy 
Wells Bidwell. He wrote his project in 1942 and forwarded it to the Department of State. His 
thoughts on these issues have been developed in other following papers. Together with the 
British ones Bidwell’s proposals were used as a basis for the negotiations engaged in 1943 by 
Americans and British on ruling international trade relations.  
This paper aims at comparing Bidwell’s and Hull’s respective stands on those matters. In 
order to preserve its historical consistency and insofar as it intends to go back to the 
theoretical sources of the WTO, this paper mainly concentrates on the writings, statements 
and actions of both those figures preceding the negotiations concretely engaged from the end 
of 1945 on international trade topics. Those negotiations ended up in the Havana Charter for 
an International Trade Organization (1948). But like every agreement negotiated at a global 
level, this charter was a complex web of compromises because in order simply to exist it had 
to take into account numerous divergent interests. From then on it escapes to a pure history of 
economic thought inquiry on the intellectual foundations of the WTO. 
1 – The origins and contexts of Hull’s and Bidwell’s projects  
 
The period of Roosevelt’s presidency was noteworthy for economists stemming from an 
academic background. In order to provide food for the Administration’s thought, Roosevelt 
tended to surround himself with academics (Kirkendall, 1962) even if he did not always                                                                                                                                                4 
decide in favour of their ideas. As regards trade policy, the Committee on Trade Agreements 
(CTA) showed this new tendency. This structure was created after passing the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) designed by Secretary of State Hull. The RTAA (1934) was 
an amendment of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act (1930). She enabled the President to take a 
temporary departure from the detailed control by Congress on treatises he would like to sign, 
in particular as far as commercial matters were concerned, and from the requirement that 
those treatises should be carried by a majority of two thirds at the Senate
1. Administration 
was offered the possibility to bilaterally negotiate modifications on up to 50% of Smoot-
Hawley tariffs on condition that it was getting sufficient reciprocal concessions from 
commercial partner countries of the United States. In that context, the CTA had among others 
to assess the impact of bilateral trade agreements to be negotiated and especially to pinpoint 
which sectors of the American economy would benefit or would be victim of them. Hull 
deliberately chose some young academic economists
2  favourably disposed towards 
liberalizing the American trade policy as members of the CTA (Eckes, 1995: 143) because 
they seemed to him impervious to the influences of domestic politics and of special interests
3
However, long before he was appointed as Secretary of State, Hull acted as a pioneer when 
championing the creation of an international structure in charge of trade topics. This he first 
did in February 1916 in a letter he sent as a Representative of Tennessee to Secretary of State 
Lansing (Hull, 1916; cf. also Hull, 1948: chapter 7 and p. 356). But the latter perceived Hull’s 
project as untimely and it did not carry through. Hull unsuccessfully repeated his proposals in 
an address to the House of Representatives in July 1916. In 1933, Hull was appointed 
Secretary of State by President Roosevelt and he held this office during the four successive 
mandates of the latter. Health problems led him to resign in November 1944, a few months 
before Roosevelt died. That is one reason why Hull did not participate in the trade 
negotiations which began at the end of 1945 and which ended in 1948 with adopting the 
Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO). During Hull’s office as a 
Secretary of State, thinking about a future international trade organization did not begin to 
. 
The RTAA reoriented in some ways the American trade policy (Schwob, 2008; 2009). 
                                                 
1 About this old procedure, Hull (1948: 252) wrote: “…no American Senate had ever approved a trade treaty 
negotiated by the Executive which materially reduced tariffs, especially when negotiated without prior 
Congressional authority. Such a tariff reduction proposal was always beaten outright or filibustered to death after 
the protected interests brought pressure on their Congressmen”. 
2 Amongst the members of the CTA, the economist Harry Hawkins inspired some aspects of Hull’s trade policy. 
A. Hansen and H.D White were also members of the CTA. 
3 The identity of the CTA members was held secret during twenty years by the Administration in order to shelter 
them from the influence of economical and political lobbyists (Eckes, 1995: 143).                                                                                                                                                5 
develop mainly within the Department of State. According to Aaronson (1991) the latter was 
understaffed and that is why it was unable to take this responsibility.  
Some works emerging in the United States on such topics before it engaged in World War II 
have been produced by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). This private and bipartisan 
structure was founded in 1921 and brought together among others businessmen and 
academics stemming from internationalist circles
4. The Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace and the Rockefeller Foundation gave it financial support and Foreign 
Affairs became its communication organ
5. But the CFR gradually developed more and more 
relations with the Department of State. From September 1939, the CFR became a think tank 
of the latter dedicated to the American post-war projects. In December 1939, the CFR created 
the War and Peace Studies project (WPS), which consisted of many work groups, and among 
them the Economic and Financial Group (EFG). A. Hansen and J. Viner jointly took its 
chairmanship. The theoretical conceptions of the two economists were different, but both 
enjoyed large recognition in the community of American economists because everyone had 
soon been chairman of the American Economic Association. An explanation of the 
developing links between the EFG and the Department of State lay in the double membership 
of L. Pasvolsky. Stemming from the Brookings Institution, member of the CFR since 1938, he 
entered the Department of State  in 1935 after having worked within the Department of 
Commerce. In February 1941 Hull appointed him Head of the Division of Special Research at 
the Department of State and in February 1942, he became one of Hull’s Assistants Secretary 
of State. At this time, the WPS was enclosed to a vaster group, the Civilian Advisory Board, 
which had to report directly to Pasvlosky
6
Such was the context in which P.W. Bidwell
 (Schulzinger, 1984: 81). 
7, member of the CFR since the beginning of the 
1930s, transmitted in august 1942 a project of an International Trade Agency
8
                                                 
4 Schulzinger (1984: chapter 1) describes the process having ended up in the creation of the CFR. 
  to the 
Department of State. The reports of the CFR were unpublished at that time: they were 
working papers exclusively dedicated to its members. But Foreign Affairs, whose connections 
with the CFR have been outlined above, published in his 1942/43 instalment a paper in which 
5 Cf. Parmar (1999, 2000). 
6 About Pasvlosky’s contribution to reshaping the world economic ordrer, Cf.: Goodwin (1998). 
7 Percy Wells Bidwell (1888 – 1970) held a PhD from Yale University (1915). He taught there some times and 
later at Buffalo University, before joining the Carnegie Institution as a researcher. He was Director of Studies at 
the CFR a large part of the period running from 1948 to 1958. He also was a member of the US Tariff 
Commission (Lissner, 1972).  
8 The first thoughts developed by Bidwell on such topics date back to 1938, when together with A. Hansen, J.T. 
Shotwell, J. Viner and others he was a member of an experts group reporting to the National Peace Committee 
and which proposed the creation of an International Commercial Organization (Bidwell, 1945: 29 – 30).                                                                                                                                                6 
Bidwell presented his thoughts on the international trade governance. Owing to the close 
dates where these two documents have been written, it can reasonably be thought that the 
Foreign Affairs paper appropriately reflected the content of the august 1942 project (Nerozzi, 
2007). The American Economic Review published in 1944 a paper where Bidwell, signing as 
a CFR member, took again his 1942 proposals and developed his ideas in favour of a deep 
reorientation of the American trade policy after the end of World War II. These two publicly 
issued documents, respectively to a large readership and to a more specialized one, can be 
considered personally engaging their author more than confidential papers meant for limited 
circles. Finally, within the period to which we restrict our paper, Bidwell submitted in 
February 1945 a paper, in which his ideas on the same topics were developed, to the 
Committee on international economic policy.  
Bidwell’s 1942 CFR working paper, jointly with a text presented by the British part and 
inspired by Meade’s 1942 proposals, served as a blueprint for the informal negotiations 
between Americans and British held at Washington in September and October 1943. Those 
meetings resulted in a background paper listing the points of agreement and disagreement 
between the two delegations. This document is known in the United Kingdom as the 
Washington Principles
9. But from 1943, just when these more or less formal commercial 
discussions were beginning with the British, and until the end of his office, Hull opposed to 




2 - The aims of international commercial negotiations 
 
Both Hull’s and Biwdell’s projects have in common to have been thought up in world wars 
contexts. And both had been preceded by some episodes of revival of protectionism, even if 
the reasons of the increasing protection in the 1879 – 1914 years were different from those of 
the 1920’s –  1930’s. Hull and Bidwell agreed that the final purpose of their respective 
projects was peace in the world. And explicitly or implicitly both held protectionism partly 
responsible for the two World Wars, which broke out during the 20th century (Hull, 1948, 81, 
84; Bidwell, 1942/43: 297, 307; Bidwell, 1944: 343). As economic matters are concerned, this 
general purpose had to be translated into peaceful and more balanced commercial relations. 
To these ends the appropriate intermediate goal was to free international trade relations by 
                                                 
9 Extracts of this document are given in Pressnell (1987: Appendix 13). 
10 Conflicts within the British government during the year 1944 also contributed to delay the negotiations. Cf. 
Pressnell (1987, 129 – 137).                                                                                                                                                7 
gradually withdrawing the different tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade [Cf. proposals (a) to 
(l) in Hull (1916) and proposals (1) to (5) in Bidwell (1944)].  
The two men also agreed to find out one root of the international crisis of the early 1930s in 
trade imbalances. They pinpointed the foreign trade surplus of the United States, especially 
the bilateral one with United Kingdom. Owing to those American surpluses, the countries 
indebted to United States were in financial straits to repay their debts, especially insofar as the 
international credit distribution was strongly impeded during this period. As a matter of fact, 
in that global structure of debts inherited from World War I, the protectionist trend of the 
American trade policy, particularly after passing the Fordney – McCumber  (1922) and Smoot 
- Hawley Tariff Acts (1930), reinforced the difficulties for commercial partner countries of 
the United States to get dollars (Bidwell 1932: 392). Bidwell added that the American tariff 
levels hindered the exports necessary for the recovery of European countries after World War 
I (Bidwell, 1930: 14). From an analytical point of view, commercial questions were therefore 
a priority for both men because they were at the origin of financial ones. This emerged from 
Hull’s 1916 proposals, where financial problems were only brought up at the end of the text 
and were showed as subordinated to international trade matters [Hull, 1916: proposition (m)]. 
But Hull had been trained as a lawyer, not as an economist, and owing to their technicalities, 
financial questions were probably unfamiliar to him. Besides, during Hull’s mandate, the 
Secretary of State was not in charge of monetary and financial questions, which were part of 
competence of the Secretary of Treasure. Implicitly Bidwell laid the stress on commercial 
policies as a means of solving the post-war world economic problems when criticizing many 
economists for relegating trade policies to background or even for neglecting them (Bidwell, 
1942/43: 297 –  298). One year later he explicitly advanced the logical precedence of 
commercial matters when he wrote: “We shall certainly also need a multilateral agreement for exchange 
stabilization. But the expansion of international trade will be a necessary condition for making these other 
methods effective.” (Bidwell, 1944: 344). And this view had already been claimed before, when 
Bidwell assessed the respective role of the international agencies proposed by other 
economists, among which an international organization for capital investment and another for 
controlling monetary and currency policies: “The activities of each of these agencies cut across the field 
of international trade; its success or failure will depend in large measure on the commercial policies adopted by 
the leading trading countries.” (Bidwell, 1942/43: 310)
11
                                                 
11 Incidentally, it is worth noting that Hull and Bidwell had a different interpretation of the crisis and of the 
ensuing global economic problems from that of the British economists Keynes and Meade, which took part in 
the international negotiations held during the 1930s and during World War II. Keynes held the liberalization of 
international trade and commercial multilateralism as of secondary importance (cf. Keynes, 1942; 1944). Meade 
. Bidwell supported the first initiatives for                                                                                                                                                8 
trade policies liberalization engaged by Hull at the beginning of his mandate of Secretary of 
State. As soon as December 1932 he argued for tariff bargaining when speaking at the 
American Economic Association (Bidwell, 1933) and later he continued to assess the first 
stage engaged by Hull as a fundamental one (Bidwell, 1944: 344, 353).  
Furthermore Hull and Bidwell shared some elements of a common interpretation of the 
domestic economic situation in America after World War I and in the recession context of the 
early 1930s in which the leading problem was employment. As soon as May 1929, i.e. five 
months before breaking out the Wall Street crash and the ensuing world crisis, Hull reported 
this problem before the Representatives and linked it to the American production surpluses 
(Hull, 1948: 133). Owing to the high productivity and huge resources of the United States, 
their production potential was much superior to domestic demand. As a consequence, 
domestic employment could not be defended through protection devices against imports.  And 
Bidwell (1932: 400) agreed. Those surpluses had to find an outlet abroad (Hull, 1948: 133) 
and tariff cuts throughout the world were the sine qua non condition to absorb them. Yet, 
according to Hull, the trade policy pursued by United States had traditionally been marked by 
a strong protection except after passing the Underwood - Simmons Tariff Act (1913), which 
substantially reduced the protection of the American markets. The protection had been 
reinforced successively by the Fordney - McCumber (1922) and the Smoot - Hawley (1930) 
Tariffs and non-tariff protection devices had been increasingly used. Bidwell (1939, 1944) 
listed the latter in the fullest detail. And Hull ascribed to United States the leading role in 
spreading increasing protectionism, thus shifting the crisis throughout the world (Hull, 1948: 
126 – 127; 355). Bidwell (1932: 395 – 396) agreed with Hull on that point and went even 
further when writing: “The rates of duty fixed in the Hawley – Smoot Tariff, which capped the climax of a 
seventy-years upward trend, were not substantially reduced in the thirty-odd trade agreements negotiated since 
1934. We built our tariff wall high, and we plugged all the loopholes by a detailed system of administrative 
regulations which were rigorously enforced.” (Bidwell, 1944: 340). Anyway, for both Hull and 
Bidwell, the protectionist trend of the US trade policy hurt long-standing American 
interests
12
As a consequence of their common interpretation of the international crisis and of the 
domestic situation in the United States, the two authors agreed giving priority to reshaping the 
American trade policy. Both claimed that, owing to the unquestionable economic leadership 
.  
                                                                                                                                                          
considered his project of an International commercial union as a complement to Keynes’s International clearing 
union project. Nevertheless, Meade gave a greater importance to the idea of a worldwide and multilateral 
commercial negotiation than did Keynes (Schwob 2007).  
12 Cf. for example (Bidwell, 1932: 25 – 26).                                                                                                                                                9 
of the United States after World War I, the American trade policy should no more be decided 
exclusively according to purely national requirements (Bidwell, 1930: 21) but had to be given 
fresh thought so as to take into account its effects throughout the world. And both thought that 
American exports could grow only if imports were growing to
13
However Hull’s ideas on trade policy were not completely disconnected from strictly national 
interests. Hull thought the liberalization of trade firstly as a means of rationalizing inefficient 
sectors of the American economy by displaying them to foreign sale’s competition (as some 
members of the CTA like Hansen and Viner suggested it), secondly as a means of furnishing 
the American consumers with foreign goods not challenging domestic substitutes, and thirdly 
as a means of increasing their purchasing power. This is why Hull came down in favour of a 
selective opening to foreign competition of carefully targeted American markets (Hull, 1948: 
374). And he chose the predominant exporter procedure of negotiation. The latter was 
suggested to him by Hawkins, which explicitly endowed it with the virtue of preserving the 
negotiation power of the United States (Eckes, 1995: 96). And Hull  (1948: 362) added: “In 
this way we could get the maximum tariff concessions for our own exports…”. This is why we conclude 
that Hull considered the different existing protection devices a means serving a negotiation 
strategy whose target was not first of all to engage his country in the way of liberalizing the 
international trade.  
. 
Such ideas still marked by some dominant national views were not present in Bidwell’s 
thought. He claimed himself that the American trade policy before World War II had kept an 
overly protectionist trend (Bidwell, 1944: 353). Of course, he thought the United States had a 
national advantage to increase imports insofar as it contributed to an increase in the 
purchasing power of American citizens (Bidwell, 1944: 353; 1945: 61). But he also 
considered that they should give up the vision they still had before World War II and which 
can be qualified as mercantilist in some way: “We must abandon the notion that exports make a 
peculiar contribution to national wealth, recognizing them merely as a means whereby we procure imports.” 
(Bidwell, 1944: 353). He accepted that this dated view had some reasons to exist in the 
context of the deflation and recession ensuing the 1929 crisis, but only in that specific context 
(Bidwell, 1944: 341). This situation was out of date in 1944 and it seemed to him it would be 
still more after the end of World War II. The new trade policy he thought should first of all 
intend to reduce American trade imbalance (Bidwell, 1944: 344) in order to make it possible 
for the United States to find out a new equilibrium in the world trade relations. He explicitly 
                                                 
13 On that point Hull’s positions are inspired by the CTA (Eckes, 1995: chapter 5). Some of its members even 
suggested increasing US imports faster than exports.                                                                                                                                                10 
evoked as the major stake the optimal allocation of world resources and not mainly of the 
American ones (Bidwell, 1942/43: 298; Bidwell, 1945: 5; 8). And he thought that Hull’s 
efforts to reshape the American trade policy in that way have been insufficient and had to be 
deepened (Bidwell, 1945: 13). 
 
3 - The international negotiation technology: bilateralism or multilateralism? 
 
In his 1916 seminal text Hull never used the word “multilateralism”. Nevertheless, he 
confirmed in his Memoirs that his project from this time on lay within such a conception of 
commercial negotiation and he reminded that during the 1920s he had frequently defended 
this option before the Congress (Hull, 1948: 356). But Hull gave up this idea for that of 
bilateral agreements implementing the unconditional most-favoured nation principle
14
According to Eckes (1995: 94), Hull began to express his preference for bilateral trade 
agreements as soon as 1929 in an address to Representatives. But on that issue he was in a 
minority including in his own party
. The 
reasons why Hull did change his position in comparison to the text of 1916 are examined 
now. 
15 and so he had to give up this idea. In an address to the 
Senate on the 5
th  of February  1932, while still supporting a permanent world economic 
congress, he asked the President to be given the authority to negotiate reciprocal tariff cuts 
(Hull, 1948: 146), but without more success. The credibility of the bilateral option grew after 
the failure of the talks at the London economic and monetary world conference (1933). Hull 
went to London believing to be given free hand by the President to negotiate multilateral tariff 
cuts. The reasons while these talks ended in failure are many. But as far as  tariffs are 
concerned, Hull held as partly responsible the ambiguousness of Roosevelt’s position linked 
to the influence of the nationalistic fraction of people around him, and even the careerism of 
some of his own colleagues
16
                                                 
14 This principle stipulates for example that members of a bilateral tariff reduction agreement extend the duties 
cuts to the same products imported form third countries not discriminating against them. 
. From that failure Hull concluded that public opinions in the 
15 Eckes (1995, p. 67) reminds that bilateral agreements were much debated in the United States at that time. 
This view dated back especially to the agreement signed with Canada in 1854, which had been perceived in 
some American circles as particularly unbalanced to the detriment of United States. 
16 Chapters 18, 19 and 26 of Hull’s Memoirs gave the details of its own version of the facts. He considered he 
had been put in a difficult position at the London world conference by Roosevelt’s choice to content himself 
with the traditional validation procedure of commercial treatises by the Congress: “A Secretary of State at the head 
of a delegation to a great world conference is under heavy handicap if his hands are thus bound.” (Hull, 1948: 257). He 
put forward some doubts about what Roosevelt really intended and seriously implicated his colleague Moley: “I 
often wondered later whether the President gave him [i.e. Moley] permission expressly or by mere silence thus to negate my 
whole plan.” (Ibid.: 353).                                                                                                                                                11 
different countries, including the United States, did not approve of multilateralism. As a 
consequence, the bilateral method of international negotiation seemed to him the only 
pragmatic way, even if less ambitious than the multilateral one, of achieving tariff cuts 
throughout the world (Hull, 1948: 356). Even before the end of the London Conference, but 
when failure was still patently obvious, he laid out this idea to some members of the 
American delegation (Ibid.: 266). And as soon as he got back to United States, he fought in 
order to get a modification of legal provisions relating to tariff negotiations
17
From 1934 and until the end of his Secretary of State mandate, Hull himself did not take any 
possible step to contribute towards the international permanent congress in charge of 
multilateral commercial matters he hoped and prayed in 1916 and at the beginning of the 
1920s. One explanation is given by Hull himself: from 1943, the Department of State was no 
more in charge of international economic negotiations (Hull, 1948: 1654) even if it still was a 
party to them. Another explanation is that Hull’s bad health did no more allow him to get 
involved in those negotiations (Dam, 2004). Nevertheless from 1943 and until the end of his 
mandate, Hull was opposed to a multilateral approach of commercial negotiation just when 
more or less formal discussions with Britain were engaged at the end of 1943. The diaries 
held by the British economist J. Meade, member of the Law Mission which went in 
Washington (September -  October 1943), testimony on Hull’s cast of mind at this time. 
Meade reports the words held to him by J. Fuqua, a member of the American delegation: “He 
said that Hawkins was a courageous and disinterested man who was running a terrific risk with his personal 
career in taking the grand line he is taking in favour of a multilateral approach to Commercial Policy, because 
Secretary of State is an ultra-cautious  man. The implication of this was, of course, that Hull is extremely 
unconvinced of the multilateral approach, and that there may be real trouble when our joint report on 
Commercial Policy goes to higher authority in the USA.” (Meade, 1943: 139)
. This fight 
ended up in 1934 with enacting the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act whose authorship is 
clearly to be ascribed to Hull. This international trade negotiation frame used from 1934 
proved some efficiency, seeing that between 1934 and 1945 about thirty bilateral commercial 
treatises had been signed by United States. However they sometimes got slender economic 
results or were much debated (Bidwell, 1944; Eckes, 1995). But the comparative virtues of 
the various negotiation technologies are not the sole explanations of Hull’s marked preference 
for the bilateral method. 
18
                                                 
17 Hull had been hoping the President would try to obtain this modification before the London conference. But 
the President failed to meet Hull’s expectation (Hull, 1948: 251).  
. This remark is not a 
18 The Washington Principles’ Section on Commercial Policy (1943) was very cautious on multilateralism and 
stated discrepancies about it between the American and British delegations.                                                                                                                                                12 
trivial one if we recall that Bidwell’s and Meade’s projects, both explicitly multilateral in 
mind, were used as bases of the discussions held at Washington with the British at the autumn 
1943. It is no less, when we remind that in-house discussions relating to “… an international 
trade organization were developed by a series of interdepartmental and interagency committees meeting 
continuously in Washington from the spring of 1943 to the summer of 1945 under chairmanship, successively, of 
Myron C. Taylor, Dean Acheson, and William L. Clayton, the Assistant Secretaries of State.” (Wilcox, 1949: 
38)
19
But other facts can explain Hull’s extreme caution towards the thoughts developing on 
commercial multilateralism in the United States and even within the Department of State 
itself.  The first one is that the political circumstances during that period were not designed to 
promote the idea of an international multilateral organization in charge of commercial topics: 
1944 was a year of presidential election and such projects gave cause for worry about 
employment in the country. Moreover, trade policy was soon a matter of rivalry between the 
Congress and the Administration and some people considered those projects unconstitutional 
insofar as they would imply giving up parts of the American sovereignty (Diebold, 1952). But 
we argue that there were also strategic reasons why Hull opposed himself to the multilateral 
approach at this time. One of the goals he was relentlessly striving towards, and Secretary of 
Treasure Morgenthau
. Finally, it is no less when we recall that Pasvlosky, one of Hull’s nearest collaborators, 
clearly opted in favour of a multilateral approach of commercial (and financial) negotiations 
in an official publication of the Department of State (Pasvlosky, 1942) and that he was a 
member of the American delegation to the Washington talks of 1943. Aaronson (1996) 
confirms Hull’s great reservations about the future ITO.  
20  as well, was dismantling the British imperial preferences system 
implemented during the Ottawa Conference of 1932. Rightly or wrongly Hull considered that 
it strongly harmed the American sales abroad
21
                                                 
19 At the end of 1941, M. Taylor and D. Acheson have been proposed by Hull and named by Roosevelt as 
members of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy (Hull, 1948: 1632).  
. Even if he thought that this system originated 
in the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act (Hull, 1948: 525), he held the British co-responsible of the 
rise in protectionism of the early 1930s. In that context, it can be thought that the bilateral 
mode of negotiation was more fitted than the multilateral one to the ends the Secretary of 
State was pursuing. As a matter of fact, the former made it possible to negotiate separately 
with different commercial partners endowed with different interests, whereas the latter would 
have diluted specific Anglo-American matters into a vaster ensemble of global questions and 
20  Although the two men were sharing this goal, Hull did not valuate Morgenthau: he reports numerous 
intrusions of the latter within the areas of competence of the Department of State (Hull, 1948: 207 – 208, 902, 
1073, 1379, 1676).  
21 There was no general agreement in the United States on that issue. Cf. Glickman (1947).                                                                                                                                                13 
would thus have offered grounds for an always strong nation, even when no more dominant, 
to deadlock the negotiation process for opportunistic or purely political reasons. Apart from 
their fears that third countries could take an opportunistic advantage from an Anglo-American 
agreement
22 and that bilateral agreements between the United States and other countries could 
harm British interests owing to the impossibility to get all those agreements coordinated, 
British politicians feared that some self-governing members of the Commonwealth and 
Dominions would accept a cut in imperial preferences in return for American concessions
23 
(Pressnell, 1988: 102). And they had some reasons for such fears. Firstly, during the Imperial 
Conference held in London (1937), the Dominions declared themselves in favour of revising 
some preferences in order to send a signal of their cooperative will to the United States 
(Schatz, 1970: 97). And during the 1942 –  1944 years, some Commonwealth countries 
showed themselves more in line with the American views on imperial preferences than with 
the British ones (Pressnell, 1987: 134 – 135; Meade, 1943:  142). In the second place, Hull 
did make no secret that the American government did militate in favour of a greater autonomy 
for the British colonies than Churchill would accept (Hull, 1948: 1478)
24
Finally, in his Memoirs, Hull recorded that at the moment where Roosevelt was dying, i.e. in 
April 1945, and when he himself had already resigned, he wrote an address to the Congress 
. In his Memoirs he 
evoked the conflict between Americans and British on such matters and he tackled the 
independence of India (Ibid.: 1482 – 1497). In case of separate negotiations of the United 
States with some self-governing members  of the Commonwealth and Dominions, the 
cohesion of the Empire would have been put in a difficult position and the desire of some 
Dominions to distance themselves from England would have been reinforced. Implicit in 
Hull’s choice in favour of bilateral negotiations, the question of economic leadership in the 
world was obviously at stake and with it that of the British Empire’s destiny after World War 
II.  But Hull recognized that in the 1938 Anglo-American bilateral agreement the British 
resisted those American attempts (Eckes, 1995: 322 note 42). They resisted later too, when 
from May 1944, a majority of Commonwealth governments came round to the British stance 
on preferences (Pressnell, 1987: 135). 
                                                 
22 The Anglo-American bilateral agreement concluded in 1938 was considered by Hull (1948: 529) as the most 
difficult to negotiate. It yielded some unquestionable results, but the latter were rapidly limited by the breaking 
out the World War II. It then has been taken over by other agreements, like the February 1942 Lend-Lease 
Agreement. Like other authors, Eckes concluded that the Anglo-American agreement had little economic results 
because political goals have finally had priority in the American diplomacy (Eckes, 1995: 152 – 153). 
23 Glickman (1947: 441) remembers that the Dominions were the first having asked a preferential treatment for 
their products by United Kingdom. 
24 Hull’s hostile stand to colonial systems and their discriminatory methods was clearly claimed in his 1916 letter 
to Lansing. And he remembered it in his Memoirs (Hull, 1948: 85).                                                                                                                                                14 
where he reminded that the RTAA was expiring on June 12 and asked it to be extended (Hull, 
1948: 1721). Of course, not renewing the RTAA could have created conditions for returning 
to protection practices. Of course, that device had to be maintained urgently for lack of 
anything better. But even if he was weakened by health problems, many points are 
noteworthy in Hull’s positions about trade policy matters  as expressed in his Memoirs. 
Firstly, he never reminded that in-house discussions relating to an international trade 
organization had occurred since 1943, as well as informal negotiation with the British on this 
topic. Secondly he never did define his thoughts about the ITO negotiations which took up 
again since 1945 and which were succeeding on March 24, 1948, with signing the clearly 
multilateralistic minded Havana Charter, whereas at the same time he explicitly feared the 
American trade policy to return to the erring ways of the 1920s and the early 1930s (Hull, 
1948: 1735). Those facts testify to Hull’s maintaining his option in favour of bilateral 
commercial negotiations and his ultra cautiousness about multilateralism, in spite of  the 
manifest changes which had happened in the world economical and geopolitical situations 
after ending World War II and in spite of the fact that the American delegation in the 
commercial negotiations clearly had taken the lead of the multilateral option from the end of 
1945. 
Unlike Hull, Bidwell took position without any ambiguity in favour of the multilateral 
approach of commercial negotiations. As soon as the early 1930s, he evoked a multilateral 
negotiation confining to tariff duties when proposing “…to invite all countries with whom we have 
unconditional treatises to conclude a new multilateral treaty by which concessions would be exchanged.” 
(Bidwell, 1933: 145). The goal pursued here was to coordinate separately negotiated treatises. 
And even if he approved of Hull’s bilateral commercial negotiations frame as a first step 
towards liberalizing the world trade, he severely judged the RTAA’s efficiency after ten 
years’ practice. On the one hand he thought it was an experienced fact that the bilateral 
agreements had produced pernicious effects on the American balance of trade: “The agreements 
were effective in stimulating exports, but their effects on our imports seems to have been negligible. Hence they 
tended to aggravate, rather than correct, the distortion in our balance of payments.” (Bidwell, 1944: 344). 
He also thought that the expected ratchet effect in the world, which yet was one of the public 
goals of the RTAA, had been low. So the RTAA had not been able to deeply correct the trend 
of national trade policies throughout the world: “But it cannot be claimed that the Hull program 
accomplished a major and general reform in commercial policies.” (Bidwell, 1942/43: 297). On the other 
hand, he considered that bilateralism would be out of time in the 1940s, because it would not 
be up to the task after ending the World War II, not to mention that the economic problems                                                                                                                                                15 
would be really different in nature from the 1930s ones which the RTAA was presumed to 
solve: “The Hull Trade Program - the only instrument of American commercial policy now available - seems to 
me inadequate for the new task.” (Bidwell, 1944: 344). And as tariffs matters, Bidwell claimed: “It 
is my contention, however, that the Hull Trade Agreements Program offers no adequate means to accomplish on 
a sufficient scale the cut in American import duties.”(Ibid.: 345). 
The arguments developed by Bidwell in favour of the multilateral approach were multiple. 
Firstly, it was evident to him that after ending World War II, the deficit of the British balance 
of trade would be greater than it was before. And in spite of the huge economic weight of the 
United States, developing bilateral commerce with the United Kingdom would not be 
sufficient to reduce that imbalance. The world trade liberalization only would be fitted to this 
goal. Secondly, the global scale of commercial problems being reinforced after ending World 
War II, bilateral negotiations managed separately and in sequence between pairs of countries 
would take much time and would be impossible to  coordinate in their economic issues. 
Potentially they could be counterproductive with respect to the goal of expansion of the world 
trade (Bidwell, 1945: 26; 33). As a consequence, multilateral negotiations were the sole 
means of coordinating the trade policies off all countries, which were the sine qua non 
condition to obtain mutual confidence (Bidwell, 1944: 346; Bidwell, 1945: 35). In absence of 
the latter, each country would speculate on the other’s real intentions and would easily find 
opportunistic motivations to hinder commercial negotiations. Thirdly, the Hull type of 
bilateral agreements proved themselves inefficient in developing and liberalizing international 
trade. Some of them consolidated power inequalities between signatory countries (Bidwell, 
1945: 33) and some other bypassed the most favoured nation treatment: “…the practice of 
narrowing the classification of tariffs items has been widely employed to confine the effects of each tariff-
bargaining agreement to the trade of the two signatories.” (Ibid.: 34). Fourthly, another of Bidwell’s 
arguments in favour of multilateralism was related to the problems raised by regional trade 
agreements. On one side, he considered that the latter contributed to setting up regional blocs 
endowed with their own dynamics acting against the aim of world trade expansion
25
                                                 
25 To evaluate the real impact of such agreements on international trade is out of the scope of this paper. It 
nowadays remains a debated question. A sketch of the blocs which had been built between the two world wars 
and an assessment of their complex effects on international trade can be found in Eichengreen – Irwin (1995).  
. On the 
other side, he thought that a multilateral organization only would be able to efficiently control 
those agreements insofar as they did have an impact not only on member countries, but on 
non-members as well (Bidwell, 1942/43: 309; Bidwell, 1944: 349). The sole way to guarantee 
the compatibility between regional agreements and a developing world trade would be to 
insert the former in an organization standing higher than them, i.e. in a worldwide                                                                                                                                                16 
organization the task of which was to achieve the world trade expansion. Finally, associating 
state trading countries like Soviet Union in an international trade negotiation could only be 
reached by the multilateral approach. 
 
4 – The conception of the international organization 
 
We can exclusively refer to Hull’s 1916 letter to Lansing in order to find out his thoughts on 
the international structure he had in mind, since from 1933 he totally abandoned this idea 
under the pressure of events. Two dimensions of the organization are emerging from that 
letter. On one side, Hull planned the settling of an interstate agreement to reduce every form 
of barriers to international trade. On the other side, he planned an arbitrage body to be 
created, the competence area of which had to be strictly limited to disputes coming within the 
international private law’s remit. The content of the (m) proposition of that letter was very 
accurate on that point: “To devise and adopt, if possible, a reasonable system of commercial arbitration 
covering dealings between traders of different countries.” (Hull 1916). This organization was clearly 
not thought by Hull as endowed with the power to settle disagreements between member 
countries relating to their trade policies. In the absence of further information about the ways 
of implementing the items of the interstate agreement on barriers to trade, we are led to 
conclude that Hull in fact proposed a private justice system meant to settle commercial 
disputes the litigants of which were private operators of international trade. This mode of 
dispute settlement supposed the parties agreed on voluntary resorting to the arbitrage 
procedure, as well as on choosing the arbiters. This type of justice, based on a consensual 
approach between the involved parties, could evidently not be rendered by a supranational 
kind of judicial body endowed with sanction powers. Insofar, Hull claimed a light cooptation-
based international structure devoted to private commercial disputes settlement, of the ICC 
International Court of Arbitration type, and leaning up an intergovernmental agreement 
relating to national trade policies. It can be said that he developed an optimistic view of the 
cooperation will of the actors of commercial relations. Firstly he did not explicitly consider 
the case where members of the interstate agreement could cheat in the application of the 
common rules negotiated in the latter. This is probably why the 1916 letter did not refer to 
any structure in charge of disputes between states about their trade policies. Secondly he did 
not consider the case where private commercial disputes were unsolvable by a consensual 
method because some private actors would not accept having resort to an arbitrage procedure.                                                                                                                                                  17 
In his various papers relating to this theme, Bidwell championed a very different conception 
of the organization. He did not share Hull’s optimism about the good will of states in 
implementing the terms of trade agreements. According to him, jealously defending their 
sovereignty by the national states was the main cause of the interwar troublesome economic 
relations in the world (Bidwell, 1945: 63). And the interwar disappointing experience of 
commercial negotiations was revealing that it was an illusion to hope that freer trade 
recommended by international conferences would be implemented spontaneously and with 
great willingness by national governments (Ibid.: 12). In his mind, the lack of an international 
body effectively dedicated to control the implementation of those recommendations was 
precisely one cause of the failure of interwar conferences attempting to liberalize international 
trade (Ibid.:  21). This is why Bidwell as soon as June 1942 clearly opted in favour of giving 
up some state sovereignty as far as commercial policies are concerned. The CFR archives 
recording the debates held within this group excluded any doubt on this point: “Mr. Maddox 
asked if Mr. Bidwell was definitely recommending the creation of an international authority which would be 
able to control national tariff schedules. There are very important political and economic implications to such a 
decision. Mr. Bidwell said that […] real international control is possible only if the states give up some power.” 
(Cited by Nerozzi, 2007: 13). The option in favour of an international organization endowed 
with some supranational power was here verbally expressed, and later confirmed in Bidwell’s 
writings. The area of competence of the organization he proposed was clearly the 
international supervision and coordination of national trade policies (Bidwell, 1942/43: 310), 
and the supervision of all bilateral trade agreements as well as the multilateral one he was 
suggesting (Bidwell, 1944: 351). The organization was assigned policy-making functions 
(Bidwell, 1945: 53) and some delimited executive duties. Fully in line with that conception 
and conflicting with Hull’s views, Bidwell proposed an organization endowed with some 
power to impose sanctions to member states. Ideally this power should have taken the form of 
a right of veto on national trade policy measures not conforming to the rules of the 
organization (Bidwell, 1944: 351). But insofar as such an option would with difficulty receive 
assent from national states, Bidwell proposed the organization to be conferred the functions of 
investigation on new restrictive measures to trade a member state planned to decide and of 
advice on national trade policies. Inspired by H. Thompson’s proposals
26
                                                 
26 In 1919 H. Thompson, member of the Federal Trade Commission “…proposed, instead of Mr. Hull’s ‘trade 
agreement congress’ a judicial body, a world tribunal, similar in its organization to the Permanent Court of International 
Justice. The principal business of this tribunal was to be the investigation of activities of international cartels. Publicity was 
the weapon by which cartel activities inimical to the public interest were to be suppressed.” (Bidwell, 1945: 28). The 
Permanent Court of International Justice was conceived in the frame of the League of Nations in order to cope 
with disputes between states. 
, he thought the                                                                                                                                                18 
organization firstly to rely on persuasion in order to gain withdrawal of trade policy measures 
contravening to rules agreed in common. He hoped the publicity of unfavourable reports to 
the trade policy followed by a member would have a deterrent effect. But in case of non-
respect for those rules by a member despite of recommendations coming from the 
organization, Bidwell proposed the former to be deprived of its right to the most favoured 
nation principle not only by the injured countries but by every member of the organization: 
“The need for sanctions might be met by providing in the convention that a finding by the Commission that any 
signatory state had failed to observe the terms of any agreement should automatically free all other member 
states from their obligation to grant it the most-favoured-nation treatment in tariff matters” (Bidwell, 1945: 
57). And the initiative to give green light for this deprivation would be up to the organization: 
“A recommendation from the commission should be sufficient to free any signatory country from its obligation 
to afford equal treatment to a recalcitrant.” (Bidwell, 1944:  351). Though Bidwell was clearly 
opposed to a an international body deciding and enforcing international trade rules 
independently from the national states (Bidwell, 1945: 57) and to an international structure 
intended to plan the international trade, he defended a philosophy which clearly entailed 
transferring some sovereignty elements form the states to the organization and which 
conceived the latter as an international body of trade rules and of control on national trade 
policies endowed with some moderate means to constrain them.  
Bidwell’s conception of the organization was really nearer than Hull’s from the WTO, both as 
shaped in the Marrakesh Agreement (1994) and as it now concretely works. Clearly the 
WTO’s remit is explicitly that of international public law
27
                                                 
27 Article 3 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes explicitly refers 
to international public law. 
 and its competence area is focused 
on the trade policies of member States. The WTO is endowed with some (admittedly 
moderate) supranational powers inasmuch as its Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) are 
conferred  some sanction powers: the DSB is competent first to decide compensations in 
favour of a member she found as being hurt by the trade policy devices of another member, 
and second to give the former permission to withdraw some of his concessions. Whereas until 
1994 the consensus based approach of dispute settlement in the GATT made it possible for a 
non-compliant state to block the decision of a dispute settlement panel. Of course, as far as 
judicial competences are concerned, the Marrakesh Agreement provides  for an arbitrage 
procedure in case of disputes between members (Article 25 of the Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes).  But this text submits the arbitral 
decisions to articles 21 and 22 defining first the conditions under which the DSB pronounces                                                                                                                                                19 
its own decisions. An arbitrage may occur, but only in case of challenging the amount of 
suspension proposed by the DSB and in order to check its conformity to the level of lost 
benefits. And the spirit of the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organisation (1948) 
was not strongly different on such matters from the one inspiring the Marrakesh agreement: 
articles 94 and 95 of the former deal with the conditions under which a Member can be 
released by the Organization from obligations or of from the grant of concessions to any 
Member
28
As a consequence, it can soundly be thought that one of the underlying but unsaid reasons 
why Hull was personally opposed to progress in the discussions and the negotiations on a 
multilateral commercial organization which occurred during the last two years of his mandate 
as a Secretary of State lies in a fundamental conflict with some other American thinkers and 
actors of those negotiations on the very philosophy of the organization to be created.  
. Insofar as the Havana Charter had been ratified by only few countries, the ITO 
was never created and the international trade community limited itself to the GATT. The 
latter did dot include chapters VII and VIII of the Havana Charter relating to the ITO and to 
the settlement of differences. The redrafted text referred to contracting parties and not to 
member states of an organization. 
 
5 – The role of the United States in the international trade negotiation 
 
From the 1930s, Hull conceived bilateralism as a means of using existing devices of the 
American trade policy as negotiation instruments in order to get concessions from partner 
countries of the United States intending to cut the world overall mean level of protection. And 
that even if he had disapproved some of those devices when passed by Congress
29
                                                 
28 Whereas Hull never did express himself about the ITO, Bidwell made his stance on this organization clear in a 
document he wrote later than in the period we consider here. He declared himself favourable to United States 
ratifying the Havana Charter. He explicitly recognized the considerable administrative and quasi-judicial 
functions of the ITO, while negating it had the power to plan the international trade. He thought that if the 
United States did not ratify the Charter, they would be bearing the serious responsibility of preventing the 
implementation of liberal principles in world trade (Bidwell – Diebold, 1949: 230 – 237). 
.  Of course, 
framing the American trade policy during the pre World War II years was only partly under 
the control of the Secretary of State: nationalist and protectionist circles were not absent 
around Roosevelt. Some trade policy measures of the New Deal, and among others some 
items of the Agriculture Adjustment Act and of the National Recovery Act, were clearly 
protectionist. Viner (1947: 618) testified that the liberal views of the Department of State did 
not always get  the upper hand, particularly because the Department of Agriculture and 
29 This view is developed in Schatz (1970) and Schwob (2009).                                                                                                                                                20 
Congress succeeded in imposing import quotas, whose principle had been disapproved by 
Hull. And Aaronson (1991) reminds that some conflicts had emerged within the Department 
of State on the appropriateness of Hull’s views about reshaping the American trade policy. If 
Hull cannot be held the sole responsible for the changes occurred in the American trade 
balance after the RTAA came into force, the American trade surplus had nevertheless been 
growing during that period. Although Hull had denounced the American leadership in 
triggering a spiral of protectionism and in spreading the 1929 crisis throughout the world 
[Hull, 1948: 126 – 127; Congressional Record march 24
th 1932 (cited by Allen, 1953)], he 
always defended a policy intending to assure the economic lead of the United States in the 
world. Owing to the huge economic power of the United States, liberalizing the international 
trade seemed to him likely to have more beneficial than prejudicial effects for them. He 
congratulated himself on having made it possible for the American trade to achieve excellent 
results two years after passing the RTAA: “… the ratio of benefit in our favour was nine to one.” 
(Hull, 1948: 262). After 1934, his positive conception of the American leadership in trade 
matters was that under their own head, the United States had offered other countries a matter 
for cuts in tariffs, thanks to the negotiation possibilities offered by the RTAA program. And 
such a commitment seemed to him both realistic and sufficient. In coherence with his idea of 
the co-responsibility of the United Kingdom and the United States in developing the 
protectionism throughout the world in the early 1930’s, he claimed in 1937 that the leadership 
in liberalizing the world trade had to be shared with the United Kingdom: United States had 
initiated it on the American continent and the British had to do it on the European one (Hull, 
1948: 524 – 525).   
Bidwell’s views were changing on such matters. He first developed a more ambitious and 
more responsible conception of the American leadership. He considered that the role of the 
new trade policy he was proposing was to increase the world trade volume, not only the 
United States’ exports: “Hence the importance of framing an American commercial policy which will 
substantially enlarge the volume of world trade.” (Bidwell, 1944: 344). This passage entailed an 
implicit criticism to the policy pursued within the framework of the RTAA, even if Bidwell 
diplomatically pointed out that he did not call the persons into question. Not only did he 
thought that this policy had mainly promoted American exportations, but he pointed that the 
commercial surplus of United States will in the future be a threat to the world economy and to 
liberalizing the international trade: “Our export surplus threatens to become in Post-war years a serious 
obstacle to the stabilization of currencies, to the general adoption of liberal trading policies abroad and to the 
expansion of international trade.” (Ibid.). The same implicit criticism to the American leadership, as                                                                                                                                                21 
practised until then, stemmed from its general conclusion: “The acceptance on our part of an 
obligation to reduce tariffs as part of a multilateral agreement will mark a departure from tradition.” (Ibid.: 
353). From his analysis of the economic position of the United States in the world, Bidwell 
deduced his positive views on the American leadership. Whilst considering in his 1942/43 
paper that the leadership had to be shared by major commercial powers in order to promote an 
international control on national trade policies, his position changed. In his paper of 1944, he 
wrote: “The success of a multilateral agreement on commercial policy of the type of which I have proposed 
would depend upon the active and loyal participation of the United States…Not in a spirit of boasting, but with a 
sober sense of the great responsibility that is inseparable of great power, we ought to recognise that the world 
will look us for leadership in all these new ventures.” (Ibid.: 353)
30. The reference to a boasting spirit 
may be understood in the light of this other passage: “The multilateral agreement of which I have 
proposed is designed to transfer this phase of economic co-operation out of the realm of general discussion into 
that of specific action.” (Ibid.). Put together these elements led us to conclude that, in Bidwell’s 
spirit as expressed in the 1944 paper, the onus was on the United States to take on the leading 
role in international commercial cooperation matters
31
 
. Owing to their dominant economic 
position in the world, their responsibility was to take the initiative for accepting losing a part 
of their sovereignty in commercial policy matters in order to give credibility to the 
multilateral agreement and thus to convince the other countries to follow the United States in 
that way. But later, he agreed on a position in some way near to Hull’s one, but in some other 
way very different: the leadership had to rest jointly on  the United States, the United 
Kingdom and the USSR (Bidwell, 1945: 6; 22; 27) if one was hoping for a multilateral trade 
agreement in a world comprising both market and state directed economies. 
Conclusion 
 
Hull unquestionably deserved all the credit for  having first championed the idea of a 
worldwide international trade negotiation. He too had put an end to the unilateralistic tradition 
                                                 
30 The history proved Bidwell right on that point after the Havana Charter had been passed in 1948. The Charter 
provided that every signatory country had to ratify it in conformity with its constitutional frame. But few 
countries ratified the Charter because a strong majority was waiting for ratification by the United States. 
Reluctantly, President Truman was constrained to give up his project of ratification by the Congress in 
December 1950. And in 1951, Secretary of State Acheson announced its definitive withdrawal (Diebold, 1952: 
24).  As a consequence the ITO was stillborn. 
31 Some trace of such a conception of the American ratchet effect can still be found long before Bidwell wrote 
his project of an international trade agency: “In 1928 and 1929 the news that an upward revision of the American tariff 
was impending was responsible to no small extent for checking the movement in Europe toward tariff reduction. A decisive 
move now by the United States toward lower tariffs might be the force needed to break the world’s tariff jam...” (Bidwell, 
1933: 146).                                                                                                                                                 22 
of the American trade policy, inasmuch as he inspired the RTAA. Finally, having learnt 
during his long political career from the realities of the international commercial negotiations 
and of the domestic context of which they depend, it must be given credit to him for a great 
pragmatism. The latter led him to take realistic stands on these matters, even if they were 
distancing in some way from his early ideals of multilateralism. However, if a spiritual father 
of what is nowadays the WTO has to be sought for in the United States, he cannot be found in 
Hull’s person. Bidwell’s project of an International trade agency was more keeping with the 
now existing WTO than Hull’s project of an International trade treaty congress, as far as the 





Aaronson, S.A. (1991): How Cordell Hull and the Postwar Planners Designed a New Trade 
Policy, Business and Economic History, Second Series, 20, 171 – 179. 
Aaronson, S.A. (1996): Trade and the American Dream: a Social History of the Postwar 
Trade Policy, Lexington, the University Press of Kentucky. 
Allen, W.R. (1953): The International Trade Philosophy of Cordell Hull, The American 
Economic Review, 43, 1, 101 – 116.  
Bidwell, P. W. (1930): The New American Tariff: Europe’s Answer, Foreign Affairs, 9, 1, 13 
- 26. 
Bidwell, P. W. (1932): Trade, Tariffs, the Depression, Foreign Affairs, 10, 3, 391 – 401. 
Bidwell, P. W. (1933): Tariff Reform: The Case for Bargaining, The American Economic 
Review, 23, 1, Supplement, Papers and Proceedings of the Forty-fifth Annual Meeting of the 
American Economic Association, 137 – 146. 
Bidwell, P. W. (1939): The Invisible Tariff – A Study of the Control of Imports into the United 
States, New York, Council on Foreign Relations. 
Bidwell, P. W. (1942/1943): Controlling Trade after the War, Foreign Affairs, 21: 1/4, 297 – 
311. 
Bidwell, P.W. (1944): A Postwar Commercial Policy for the United States, The American 
Economic Review, 34, 1, Part 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Fifty-sixth Annual Meeting of 
the American Economic Association, 340 – 353.                                                                                                                                                23 
Bidwell, P.W. (1945): A Commercial Policy for the United Nations, Paper submitted to the 
Committee on International Economic Policy by its Advisory Committee on Economics, New 
York. 
Bidwell, P.W. -  Diebold Jr., W. (1949):  The United States and the International Trade 
Organization, Series: International Conciliation, 449, 187 – 237. 
Curzon Price, V. (2004): Place of Non-Discrimination in an Integrating World Economy, 
Trade Policy Analysis, 6,7, www.cordellhullinstitute.org/pubs/index.html 
Dam, K.W. (2004): Significance of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, Trade Policy 
Analysis, 6, 4, www.cordellhullinstitute.org/pubs/index.html. 
Diebold Jr., W. (1952): The End of the ITO, Essays in International Finance, International 
Finance section, Department of Economics and Social Institutions, Princeton University, 16, 1 
– 37 
Eckes Jr., A.E. (1995):  Opening America’s Market – US Foreign Trade Policy since 1776, 
Chapel Hill & London, The University of North Carolina Press. 
Eichengreen, B. – Irwin, D.A. (1995): Trade Blocs, Currency Blocs and the Reorientation of 
World Trade in the 1930s, Journal of International Economics, 38, 1 – 24. 
Glickman, D.L. (1947): The British Imperial Preference System, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 61,3, 439 – 470. 
Goodwin, C. (1998): Vision Accomplished: Harold Moulton and Leo Pasvlosky of the 
Brookings Institution as Champions of the New World Order; in: Rutherford Ed. (1998), 89 – 
95. 
Hagel, C. (2003): Relevance of Cordell Hull’s Legacy to Today, Trade Policy Analysis, 5,4, 
www.cordellhullinstitute.org/pubs/index.html 
Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (1948), Geneva, WTO,   
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/prewto_legal_e.htm#havana 
Howson, S. Ed. (1988): The Collected Papers of James Meade; Vol. 3: International 
Economics, London, Unwin – Hyman. 
Howson, S., Moggridge, D. Eds. (1990): The Wartime Diaries of Lionel Robbins and James 
Meade 1943 - 45, London, MacMillan. 
Hull, C. (1916): Letter to Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, Washington D.C, Committee on 
Ways and Means, House of Representatives. 
Hull, C. (1948): Memoirs of Cordell Hull, New York, The Macmillan Company. 
Keynes, J.M. (1942): To James Meade, 15 December; in Moggridge, D. Ed. (Vol. 26, 1980, 
272 - 275).                                                                                                                                                24 
Keynes, J.M. (1944): To D.H. Robertson and Sir W. Eady, 31 May; in Moggridge, D. Ed. 
(Vol. 26, 1980, 25 - 26) 
Kirkendall R.S. (1962): Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Service Intellectual, The Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review, 44, 3, 456 – 471. 
Lissner W. (1972): In memoriam Percy Wells Bidwell (1888 – 1970), The American Journal 
of Economics and Sociology, 31, 2, 208. 
Meade, J. (1942): A Proposal for an International Commercial Union, in: Howson, S. Ed. 
(1988), 27 – 35. 
Meade J. (1943): The Law Mission, September-October 1943; in: Howson, S., Moggridge, D. 
Eds (1990), 92 – 155. 
Moggridge, D.E. Ed. (1971 -  1982):  The Collected Writings of J.M. Keynes, London: 
Macmillan & Cambridge University Press for the Royal Economic Society. 
Nerozzi S. (2007): Building up a Multilateral Strategy for the United States: Alvin Hansen, 
Jacob Viner and the Council on Foreign Relations (1939 – 1945), Working Paper N. 08/2007, 
Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Universita degli Studi di Firenze. 
Parmar, I. (1999): Mobilizing America for an Internationalist Foreign Policy: the Role of the 
CFR, Studies in American Political Development, 13, 2, 337 – 373. 
Parmar I. (2000): The Carnegie Corporation and the Mobilisation of Opinion in the United 
States’ Rise of Globalism, 1939 – 1945, Minerva, 37,4, 355 – 378. 
Pasvolsky, L. (1942): The Problem of Economic Peace after the War, Department of State 
Bulletin, March 7. 
Pressnell L.S. (1988): External Economic Policy since the War, London, Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Office. 
Rutherford, M. Ed. (1998): The Economic Mind in America: Essays in the History of 
American Economics, New York, Routledge. 
Schatz A.W. (1970): The Anglo-American Trade Agreement and Cordell Hull’s Search for 
Peace 1936 – 1938, The Journal of the American History, 57, 1, 85 – 103. 
Schulzinger R.D. (1984): The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs – The History of the Council on 
Foreign Relations, New York, Columbia University Press. 
Schwob (2007): Keynes, Meade, Robbins et l’Organisation internationale du commerce, 
L’Actualité économique ; Revue d’analyse économique 83, 2, 255 – 283. 
Schwob C. (2008): La politique commerciale des Etats-Unis et la question du leadership entre 
1900 et 1944, Economies et Sociétés, « Série Histoire économique quantitative », AF, 39, 
1645 – 1684.                                                                                                                                                25 
Schwob C. (2009): Did the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 initiate a Revolution in 
the American Trade Policy?, Historical Social Research, 34, 4,  377 – 389. 
The Washington Principles (1943); in Pressnell (1987), 390 – 396. 
Viner J. (1946/47): Conflict of Principles in Drafting a Trade Charter, Foreign Affairs; An 
American Quarterly Review, 25, 1/4, 612 - 628. 
Wilcox, C. (1949): A Charter for World Trade, New York, Macmillan. 
WTO Agreement, Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes, Geneva, WTO, www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 